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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALTA FAYE WALKER LAKE and
LYNN ALVIN LAKE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
vs.
HERMES ASSOCIATES,

No. 14291

Defendant-Respondent.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves the construction of two written contracts
which the parties admit and the trial court found to be fully
integrated.

No issues of fact were presented.

On non-jury

trial, the court was called upon only to read and construe the
contracts.
DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT
The contracts provided for the sale of undivided interests
in land for a stated initial consideration, paid at the time of
contract execution, plus additional consideration in the event
a higher price was paid for similar interests in the same land
in probate proceedings then pending.

The trial court held that

no price escalating event as contemplated by the contracts had
occurred and dismissed plaintiffs1 complaint seeking additional
consideration.
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~ 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about February 26, 1973, Respondent was undertaking
to acquire the total fee estate in certain real property (the
"Tract") located at approximately 7200 South on Ninth East
Street where a shopping mall was in course of development.
The Tract was held in undivided ownership as follows (Exhibits
IP, 2P, 3P and 4P):
Owner

Interest Owned

Estates of Minnetta and
Ila Minnetta Walker

four-ninths

Estate of R. E. Walker

one-ninth

Alta Faye Walker Lake

one-ninth

Austin L. Walker

one-ninth

J. B. Walker

one-ninth

Estate of Roma Walker Grock
(Appellant Lynn Lake succeeded
to the interest of Roma Walker
Grock as the sole devisee under
her will)

one-ninth

In pursuit of its goal, Respondent had submitted offers to
purchase the interests of the Estates of Minnetta, Ila Minnetta,
and R. E. Walker at some time before February 26, 1973 (R-58).
On February 26, Respondent entered into a contract with Appellant
Lynn Lake which is Exhibit 2P.

On the same date Respondent

executed and transmitted to Appellant Faye Lake a similar contract (Exhibit IP) which she executed on February 28. No issue
is raised as to the validity of these instruments which will
herein be referred to as the "contracts".

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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We will comment on specific clauses of the contracts in
the course of argument.

It is sufficient here to note that

both contracts contemplate that $10,000.00 will be paid to
the seller in any event and that additional compensation will
be paid in the event more than $10,000.00 per one-ninth interest
is paid to the "various Walker estates" in the pending probate
proceedings.

The language of the price escalation clause in

the Lynn Lake contract, at least, arguably provides for escalation
only if "competitive bidding" influences the price in the probate
proceedings.

In the Faye Lake contract, Respondent makes an

unconditional promise to pay whatever price per ninth is eventually
confirmed.
Respondent (i.e. either Mr. Vidalakis, one of the partners,
or Respondent's attorney) prepared both contracts (R-57).
After the contracts were executed and in effect, these
were the developments in the probate proceedings:
A.

Estate of R. E. Walker (Exhibit 3P)
Respondent increased its offer, dealt directly

with the heirs who consented to sale without hearing, and
obviated the competitive bidding anticipated when the
contracts were executed (Exhibit 3P).
B.

Estates of Minnetta and Ila Minnetta Walker
(Exhibit 4P)
1.

At the hearing on the Petition for

Confirmation of Sale to Respondent (on the terms of
the offer pending as recited in the contracts) there
was competitive bidding, and the court declared J. B.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Walker to be the high bidder at a price of $15,200.00
per net acre, the acreage to be determined by survey.
There was nevertheless confusion about how "net
acreage" should be computed.
2.

Mr. Walker deposited $92,611.82.

Respondent moved to vacate the sale to J. B.

Walker on the grounds he was not the high bidder, had
failed to make his offer in writing, and Respondent
was the high bidder.
3.

The court vacated the sale to J. B. Walker

on October 23, 1973.
4.

On October 26, before the time for appeal

from the order vacating the sale to him had expired,
J. B. Walker died.
5.

On the basis of waivers and consents by

the heirs, sale was confirmed at $88,572.08, or
$22,143.02 per one-ninth interest without further
opportunity for competitive bidding.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN APPELLATE COURT IS NOT UNDER COMPULSION
TO ADHERE TO A TRIAL COURT'S CONSTRUCTION
OF AN INTEGRATED CONTRACT
;
It is, of course, an axiom of appellate practice that a
finding of fact will not be disturbed on appeal if supported
by credible evidence.

Where evidence is presented on disputed

issues of fact, the demeanor, sincerety, and general credibility
of the witnesses are factors of almost controlling influence,
Digitized by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law School,
— ^ 4-VK=> ^nnellate
court
has
little
basis
for BYU.
evaluating them.
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The same considerations do not apply where the function
of the trial judge was merely to read and construe a written
instrument recognized to be integrated.

In that circumstance,

witness evaluation is not a component of the adjudicative
process, and appellate judges are as competent to construe
language as trial judges.
The statement of this doctrine appears most frequently
in decisions of federal courts because there is a specific
rule (Rule 52, FRCP) which obligates circuit courts of appeal
to accept trial court findings unless "clearly erroneous".
Commenting on the application of Rule 52 to a trial court's
construction of an integrated instrument, Milton Green, in
his Basic Civil Procedure (University Text Book Series, Foundation Press, 1972), says:
"There is a federal rule covering this
situation which states: "Findings of fact shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses." This rule was interpreted in Orvis
v. Higgins* perhaps the most frequently cited
case on the subject, in which Judge Frank puts
the whole matter in perspective in the following
succinct summation:
In the light of the Gypsum case, we
may make approximate gradations as follows:
We must sustain a general or a special
verdict when there is some evidence which
the jury might have believed, and when a
reasonable inference from that evidence
will support the verdict, regardless of
whether that evidence is oral or by deposition. In the case of findings by an administrative agency, the usual rule is substantially the same as that in the case of a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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jury, the findings being treated like a
special verdict. Where a trial judge sits
without a jury, the rule varies with the
character of the evidence: (a) If he
decides a fact issue on written evidence
alone, we are as able as he to determine
credibility, and so we may disregard his
finding. (b) Where the evidence is partly
oral and the balance is written or deals
with undisputed facts, then we may ignore
the trial judge's findings and substitute
our own, (1) if the written evidence or
some undisputed fact renders the credibility
of the oral testimony extremely doubtful, or
(2) if the trial judge's findings must rest
exclusively on the written evidence or the
undisputed facts, so that his evaluation of
credibility has no significance, (c) But
where the evidence supporting his finding
as to any fact issue is entirely oral testimony, we may disturb that finding only in
the most unusual circumstances."
Other cases in which Judge Frank's view has been expressed are
Rockwood and Co. v. Adams, CA Colo. 1973, 486 F2d 110; Kind v.
Clark, CCA NY 1947, 161 F2d 36; Seagrove Corp. v. Mount, CA
Ohio 1954, 226 F2d 62.
POINT II
THE ACCEPTED RULES OF CONSTRUCTION REQUIRE
THAT THE PRINCIPAL APPARENT INTENT OF THE
PARTIES BE CARRIED OUT AND THAT, IN SITUATIONS
WHERE MORE THAN ONE REASONABLE MEANING CAN BE
ASCRIBED TO THE WORDS OF A CONTRACT, THE
MEANING WHICH DISFAVORS THE WRITER WILL BE
ADOPTED
Even where contracts can properly be found to meet the tests
of integration, their words can be subject to two or more interpretations.

In the instant case, Appellants contend that the

words can only be construed to mean that Appellants would receive
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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as much for their one-ninth interests as did any of the "various
Walker estates" from which Respondent intended to purchase
"similar interests" by procedures under which "competitive
bidding" was possible.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends for a construction
of the contract which imposes an obligation to pay additional
compensation only if the price paid in the probate proceedings
was the exact price established by a bidding procedure and
applied uniformly to all of the one-ninth interests (one-ninth
in the R. E. Walker Estate and four-ninths in the Minnetta and
Ila Minnetta Walker Estate) for which Respondent had submitted
purchase offers.
In situations where two interpretations of language are
reasonable, there are principles of construction which are
universally applied.

They have been frequently stated in cases,

texts, and restatements, and should require no general exposition
here.

The two principles we consider to be of controlling import

here are (1) an interpretation should be given which achieves the
principal apparent intent of the parties, and (2) that interpretation should be favored which operates most strongly against the
party who wrote the contract.
These principles are stated in all the major treatises on
contracts and in such a profusion of cases that citation should
be unnecessary.

Williston On Contracts, Jaeger Third Edition,

Volume 4, states the principles as follows:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(1) "The court will if possible give effect to
all portions of the instrument, and an interpretation which gives a reasonable meaning
to all its provisions will be preferred to
one which leaves a portion of the writing
useless or inexplicable."
(p. 731) "An
interpretation which gives effect to the
main apparent purpose of the contract is
favored" (p. 733, our emphasis).
"It is a fundamental rule in the interpretation of agreements that we should ascertain
the prime object and purpose of the parties,
and, in case of ambiguity produced by its
minor provisions, the latter should, if
possible, be so construed as not to conflict
with the main purpose. . . . In many cases
a more stringent rule has been laid down,
which is that, if the minor provision of the
contract is irreconcilable with the obvious
general intent, it would for that reason be
sacrificed altogether for the promotion of
the general purpose of the agreement"
(p. 733, 734).
(2) Section 621 - Language Will Be Interpreted
Most Strongly Against The Party Using it
"Since one who speaks or writes can, by exactness of expression, more easily prevent mistakes
in meaning than one with whom he is dealing,
doubts arising from ambiguity of language are
resolved in favor of the latter, and he will
ordinarily be the promissee of the promise in
question; it is sometimes stated that the contract
if ambiguous, will be interpreted in favor of the
promise".
The Restatement of Contracts incorporates these rules of
construction in Section 236, particularly subsections (b) and
(d):
" (b) The principal apparent purpose of the
parties is given great weight in determining
the meaning to be given to manifestations of
intention or to any part thereof."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"(d) Where words or other manifestations of
intention bear more than one reasonable meaning an interpretation is preferred which
operates more strongly against the party
from whom they proceed, unless their use
by him is prescribed by law."
POINT III
THE CLEAR INTENT OF THE PARTIES WAS TO ASSURE
APPELLANTS AS HIGH A PRICE FOR THEIR INTERESTS
AS PROBATE PROCEEDINGS WOULD BRING, AND
RESPONDENT WROTE THE CONTRACTS
The two contracts (Exhibits IP and 2P) use slightly different
but similar language to state the basis upon which Appellants
would be entitled to receive additional or escalated consideration
for the property they agreed to sell.

In Exhibit IP, the language

"So that there may be no misunderstanding, I wish
you to know that I have made a bid for the other
5/9ths interest in the various Walker estates, and
although my bid is based on approximately $5,000.00
per acre, it is possible that at the court confirmation of sale, the price will be improved by competitive bidding. I agree that if an amount in excess
of $10,000 for each 1/9 interest is paid, whether
or not the amount is paid by me, I will pay to you,
as a premium in cash within Sixty (60) days that
amount that is necessary to make your sales price
the same as the sales price on the court-confirmed
sale."
In Exhibit 2P, the language is:
"INCREASE IN PURCHASE PRICE It is understood that under no circumstances
will the purchase price decrease, but if the bids
for similar interests in various walker estates
are improved by competitive bidding, then we agree
that if an amount in excess of $10,000 for each
1/9 interest is bid and paid in the said court
proceedings covering the 5/9th walker Estate interests,
then the amount finally paid by us to you hereunder
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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shall become the price paid per 1/9 in said
court proceedings* We hereby agree to pay you,
as a premium in cash, the difference between
$10,000 and the ultimate sales price at the
court-confirmed sale in the Walker estates."
One background fact against which the parties negotiated
is clearly revealed by the language employed; Respondent had
submitted offers to the Walker estates which all parties
expected to be the subject of petition for confirmation of
sale under circumstances where competitive bidding would be
possible.

Since the offers had been accepted and were merely

awaiting the preparation of petitions for confirmation, the
only event which Appellants could anticipate to have a price
escalating influence was competitive bidding.

Appellants

were clearly reluctant to sell before the value-setting effect
of that bidding procedure could be perceived, and Respondent
assured thera they would receive as much as the estates received.
The language Dr. Vidalakis and his attorney employed did
not obviously (whatever might have been in their minds at the
time) contemplate what the effect of Respondent's circumventing
competitive bidding would be.

Indeed, Respondent's representa-

tion that competitive bidding opportunity would be afforded is
sufficiently strong so that its circumvention by Respondent was
arguably a violation of the agreement.

The very foundation of

the bargain was that the influence of competitive bidding would
be given free play.
Appellants were not obliged to rely on Respondent's postcontract negotiations with the Walker estates as contract
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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violations, however, because there was competitive bidding,
it did result in a higher price than $10,000.00 per ninth's
being paid for interests in the Tract.
The trial court construed the contracts to provide for
a price escalation only if (1) the final price paid and confirmed by the probate court was the same in the R. E. Walker
Estate proceeding as in the Minnetta, Ila Minnetta Estate proceeding and (2) the estates' interests were in fact sold to the
high bidders at the high bid.

Neither contract so provides.

Let us examine the two contracts separately.
A*

The Lynn Lake Contract
The Lynn Lake contract provides that "if the bids in

various Walker estates are improved by competitive bidding,
then. . . . the amount finally paid by us to you hereunder
shall become the price paid per 1/9 in said court proceedings".
It does not provide that the final transaction in the probate
proceedings has to be a sale to the highest bidder at the highest
bid price.

It is enough to effectuate the escalation clause

that the amount paid for each.one-ninth interest is "improved
by competitive bidding".
It is perfectly obvious that, except for competitive bidding,
Respondent would have purchased all the one-ninth interests at
$10,000.00 per ninth, the amount of his offers which were the
subject of the probate proceedings.
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We submit that the trial court took a strained and contorted
view of the contract language in holding that the price paid per
ninth to the Walker estates was not improved by competitive bidding.

The price Respondent paid was just enough below the amount

deposited by J. B. Walker to dissuade the Executor from appealing
the order vacating the sale to J. B. Walker after his death*
B.

The Faye Lake Contract
In the Faye Lake contract, Respondents promise is not

tied to competitive bidding in any way.

The language includes

a recital that "it is possible. . . . the price will be improved
by competitive bidding", but the promise is not conditional upon
the means by which the price is increased.

This is the language

of the promise:
"I agree that if an amount in excess of $10,000
for each 1/9 interest is paid, whether or not the
amount is paid by me, I will pay to you, as a premium in cash within Sixty (60) days that amount
that is necessary to make your sales price the
same as the sales price on the court-confirmed
sale."
CONCLUSION
This lawsuit presents a pure language construction problem.
The only issue is whether events occurred which effectuated the
price escalation clauses of the contracts.

If the language is not

fully reflective of the parties1 intent, the deficiency is chargeable to Respondent, the author.

Obviously the main purpose of
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the escalation clauses was to assure Appellants as much per
ninth as anyone else was paid for a similar interest.

The

trial court's construction frustrates the purpose of the escalation clauses and otherwise violates accepted rules of construction
and common sense.
This court is under no compulsion to adhere to the trial
courtfs interpretation of the contracts, and should reverse
with appropriate instructions.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK J. ALLEN
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants

Mailed copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to Nick
J. Colessides, Attorney for Respondent, Suite 202 - 610 East
South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, postage prepaid.
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